As briefly mentioned in the measured boot blog post, I had some issues with a TPM in the emulated environment. In the end, I bought a physical TPM chip for Raspberry Pi and verified that the measured boot worked as intended on the actual hardware, confirming that the issues I encountered were likely due to my somewhat esoteric virtual setup. Getting this LetsTrust TPM module working was fairly simple but there were a few things I learned along the way that may be worth sharing.
LetsTrust TPM Module
First of all, let’s clarify what is this LetsTrust TPM module. It’s a TPM module that connects to the Raspberry Pi’s GPIO pins, and communicates with the Raspberry Pi via SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface). The chip in the module is Infineon’s SLB9672. There are a few other TPM modules for Raspberry Pi, but this LetsTrust module was cheap and readily available, so I decided to get it. I still don’t quite understand the full capabilities of TPM devices, but it seems to work quite well for the little use I have so I think it’s worth the money. This was my comprehensive hands-on review of it.
There’s a surprisingly high amount of resources for integrating the LetsTrust TPM module into the Yocto build: two. First of all, there’s this guide which goes deep into details and is fairly thorough. Secondly, there’s this meta-slb9670-rpi layer that does most of the things required for integrating the module into the Yocto build. SLB9670 in the name of the meta-layer is the earlier version of the Infineon chip that was used in the older versions of the LetsTrust module.
The guide is a bit outdated and not all of the steps in it seem to be mandatory anymore, but here’s an outline of what needs to be done to get the LetsTrust working with Raspberry Pi:
Create a device tree overlay that enables the SPI bus and defines the TPM module
Configure TPM to be enabled in the kernel and U-boot
Enable SPI TPM drivers in the kernel
Add TPM2 software stack to the image
(Outdated) Patch U-boot to communicate to the module via GPIOs using bit-banging
(Optional) Add a service to enable TPM in Linux
The meta-slb9670-rpi layer does these things, and a bit more to define a FIT image and the boot script.
Updating meta-slb9670-rpi
However, the layer has not been updated since Dunfell version of Yocto. The upgrade from Dunfell to Scarthgap is fortunately fairly straightforward as it’s mostly syntax fixes. The meta-layer had a few other issues though. Booting the FIT image didn’t work because the boot script loaded the image too close to the kernel load address, overwriting the image when kernel was loaded. I made the executive decision to load the FIT image to the initrd load address because there’s plenty of space there and the boot is not using initrd anyway. A few other things in the meta-layer required clean-up as well, like removing some unused files and a service that loaded tpm_tis_spi module that was actually being built as a kernel built-in feature.
You can find the updated branch from my fork of meta-slb9670-rpi. Adding that layer with the dependencies should be enough to do the trick. The trick, in this case, is adding the LetsTrust module to Yocto builds. Simple as that. So, what’s the point of this blog post? First, to showcase the updated meta-layer, and second, to introduce the measured boot functionality I added. That was a slightly more complicated affair. But not too much, no need to be scared. However, before proceeding I recommend taking a look at the meta-layer and it’s contents, because it will be referenced later on.
Second, I want to say that I’m not a big fan of SystemD, and after writing this text I have once again a bit more repressed anger towards it. Because, for some reason, reading the measured boot event log just does not work on SystemD. tpm2_eventlog command either says that the log cannot be read, or straight up segfaults. Reading PCR registers works just fine though. I still haven’t found the exact root cause for this, but I hope I’ll find it soon because I need some of the SystemD features for the upcoming texts. It may be related to the device management. If I figure out how to fix this I’ll add a link here, but for the time being these instructions are only for SysVinit-style systems. My SEO optimizer complains that this chapter is too long, but in my opinion, SystemD rants can never be too long.
Back to the actual business. The first step of adding the measured boot is enabling the feature in the U-boot configuration. However, we want to enable measured boot without the devicetree measurement, so the additional configuration looks like this:
CONFIG_MEASURED_BOOT=y
# CONFIG_MEASURE_DEVICETREE is not set
It seems that the PCRs are not constant if the devicetree is measured. I’m not 100% sure why, but my theory is that the proprietary Raspberry Pi bootloader that runs before U-Boot edits the devicetree on-the-fly, and therefore the devicetree measured by U-boot is never constant. I suppose RasPi bootloader does this to support the different RAM variants without requiring a separate devicetree for each. The main memory size is defined as zero in the devicetree source and there is a “Will be filled by the bootloader” comment next to the zero value, so at least something happens there.
Next, the memory region for the measurement log needs to be defined. In the measured boot blog post two methods for this were presented: either defining a reserved-memory section or defining sml-base and sml-size. I mentioned in the blog post that I couldn’t get sml-base working with QEMU, but with Raspberry Pi it was the opposite. Defining a reserved-memory block didn’t work, but the linux,sml-base and linux,sml-size did. I have a feeling that this is related to the fact that the memory node in devicetree is dynamically defined by the bootloader, but I cannot prove it.
So, to define the event log location we just add the two required parameters under the TPM devicetree node in the letstrust-tpm-overlay like this:
Note how I fixed the bad bad thing I did the last time. The event log should now be aligned to the end of the free RAM (non-reserved areas checked from /proc/iomem). This is only the case for my 4GB RAM RPI4 though, with the 2GB and 8GB versions the memory region is either in a wrong or non-existent place. I’m starting to understand the reasoning behind the dynamic memory definition done by the bootloader.
Et voilà! Just with these two changes tpm2_eventlog and tpm2_pcrread can now be used to read the boot measurements after booting the image. I created scarthgap-measured-boot-raspberrypi4-4gb branch (strong contender for the longest branch name I’ve ever created) for this feature because for now the measured boot works properly only on the 4GB variant using SysVinit, so it shouldn’t be merged into the main scarthgap branch. Maybe in the future there will be rainbows, sunshine and working SystemD-based systems.
Oh yes, it’s time for more of the security stuff. We are getting into the difficult things now. So far we have mostly been focusing on hardening the kernel and userspace separately, but this time we will zoom out a bit and take a look at securing the entire system. First, we are going to start hardening the boot process to prevent unwanted bootflows and loading undesired binaries.
I know that there is a philosophical and moral question of whether doing this is “right”, potentially locking the devices from the people using them. I’m not going to argue too much in either direction. I’d like everything to be open and easily hackable (in the good sense of the word), but because the real world is the way it is, keeping the embedded devices open doesn’t always make sense. Mostly because of the hacking (in the bad sense of the word). Anyway, I hope you use the power you will learn for good.
What Is Measured Boot
Simply put, the measured boot is a boot feature that hashes different boot components and then stores the hashes in immutable hash chains. The measured boot can perform hashing during different stages of the boot. The hashed items can for example be the kernel binary, devicetree, boot arguments, disk partitions, etc. These calculated hashes usually then get written to the platform configuration registers (PCR) in TPM.
These registers can only be extended, meaning that the existing value in the register and the new value get hashed together, and this combined hash then gets stored in the register. This creates a chain of hashes. This can then be called a “blockchain”, and it can be used to raise unlimited venture capital funding (or at least it was possible before AI became the hype train locomotive). The hash chain can also be used to detect unwanted changes in the chain because if one of the hashes in the chain changes, all the subsequent hashes after that will be changed as well.
To make actual use of these registers and their contents, attestation should be performed. In attestation, it is decided whether the system is in an acceptable state or not for performing some actions. For example, there could be a check that the PCRs contain certain expected values. Then, if the system is considered to be cool, for example filesystems may be decrypted, services could be started, or remote connections may be made.
It’s worth noting that measured boot doesn’t prevent loading or running unwanted binaries or configurations, it just makes a note if such a thing happened. Attestation on the other hand may prevent some unexpected things from happening if it is configured to do so. To prevent loading naughty stuff into your system, you may want to read about the secure boot. There’s even a summary of the differences coming sooner than you think!
Measured Boot vs. Secure Boot
Secure boot is a term that’s often confused with the measured boot, or the trusted boot, or the verified boot, so it is worth clarifying how these differ. This document sums it up nicely, but I’ll briefly summarize the differences in the next paragraphs. The original link contains some more pros and cons explained in an actually professional manner, so I recommend checking it out if you have the time.
In secure boot (also known as verified boot) each boot component checks the signatures of the next boot item (e.g U-boot checks Linux kernel, etc.), and if these don’t match with the keys stored in the device, the boot fails. If they match, the component doing the measurement transfers the control to the next component in boot chain. This fairly rigid system gives more control over the boot process, but signature verification and key storage aren’t trivial problems to solve. Also, updates to this kind of system are difficult.
Measured boot (also known as trusted boot) only measures the boot items and stores their hashes to TPM’s PCRs. It is then the responsibility of the attestation process to decide if the event log is acceptable or not for proceeding. This is more flexible and allows more options than a simple “boot or no boot”, but it is quite complex, and in theory, may allow booting some bad configurations if attestation isn’t sufficient. Performing the attestation itself isn’t that easy either. While local attestation is simpler to set up, it’s susceptible to local attacks, and with remote attestation, you have a server to set up and need a secure way of transferring the hashes to the attestation server.
So, despite having quite similar names, secure boot and measured boot are quite different things. Therefore a single system can have both systems in place. It’s actually a good idea, assuming the performance and complexity hits are acceptable. The performance hit is usually tolerable, as the actions need to be performed once per boot (as opposed to some encrypted filesystems where every filesystem operation takes a hit). Complexity on the other hand, well… In my experience, things won’t surely become easier after implementing these systems. All in all, everything requires more work and makes life miserable (but hopefully for the bad actors as well).
Adding Measured Boot to Yocto
Now that we know what we’re trying to achieve, we can start working towards that goal. As you can guess, the exact steps vary a lot depending on your hardware and software. Therefore, it’s difficult to give the exact instructions on how to enable measured boot on your device. But, to give some useful advice, I’m going to utilize the virtual QEMU machine I’ve been working on a few earlier blog texts.
I’ve enabled measured boot also on Raspberry Pi 4 & LetsTrust TPM module combination using almost the same steps as outlined here, so the instructions should work on actual hardware as well. I’ll write a text about this a bit later…
Edit: The text for enabling the measured boot on Raspberry Pi 4 is now available, check it out here.
Configuring U-Boot
You want to start measuring the boot as early as possible to have a long hash chain. In an actual board, this could be something like the boot ROM (if boot ROM supports that) or SPL/FSBL. In our emulated example, the first piece doing the measurement is the U-boot bootloader. This is fairly late because we can only measure the kernel boot parameters, but we can’t change the boot ROM and don’t have SPL so it’s the best we can do.
Since we’re using U-Boot, according to the documentation enabling the boot measurement requires CONFIG_MEASURED_BOOT to be added into the U-Boot build configuration. This requires hashing and TPM2 support as well. You’ll most likely also want CONFIG_MEASURE_DEVICETREE to hash the device tree. It should be enabled automatically by default, at least in U-boot 2024.01 which I’m using it is, but you can add it just in case. The configuration fragment looks like this:
# Dependencies
CONFIG_HASH=y
CONFIG_TPM_V2=y
# The actual stuff
CONFIG_MEASURED_BOOT=y
CONFIG_MEASURE_DEVICETREE=y
Measured boot should be enabled by default in qemu_arm_defconfig used by our virtual machine, so no action is required to enable the measured boot for that device. If you’re using some other device you may need to add the configs. On the other hand, if you’re using something else than U-Boot as the bootloader, you have to consult the documentation of that bootloader. Or, in the worst case, write the boot measurement code yourself. U-Boot measures OS image, initial ramdisk image (if present), and bootargs variable. And the device tree, if the configuration option is enabled.
Editing the devicetree
Next, if you checked out the link to U-Boot documentation, it mentions that we also have to make some changes to our device tree. We need to define where the measurement event log is located in the memory. There are two ways of doing this: either by defining a memory-region of tcg_event_log type for the TPM node, or by adding linux,sml-base and linux,sml-size parameters to the TPM node. We’re going to go with the first option because the second option didn’t work with the QEMU for some reason (with the Raspberry Pi 4 it was the other way around, only linux,sml-base method worked. Go figure.)
For this, we first need to decompile our QEMU devicetree binary that has been dumped in the Yocto emulation blog texts (check those out if you haven’t already). The decompilation can be done with the following command:
dtc -I dtb -O dts -o qemu.dts qemu.dtb
Then, you can add memory-region = <&event_log>; to the TPM node in the source so that it looks like the following:
Commit showing an example of this can be found from here. I had some trouble finding the correct location and addresses for the reserved-memory. In the end, I added reserved-memory node to the root of the device tree. The address is defined to be inside the device memory range, and that range is (usually) defined in the memory node at the root of the devicetree. The size of the event log comes from one of the U-Boot devicetree examples if I remember right.
Note that my reserved memory region is a bit poorly aligned to be in the middle of the memory, causing some segmentation. You can move it to some other address, just make sure that the address is not inside kernel code or kernel data sections. You can check these address ranges from a live system by reading /proc/iomem. For example, in my emulator device they look like this;
Once you’re done with the device tree, you can compile the source back into binary with the following command (this will print warnings, I guess the QEMU-generated device tree isn’t 100% perfect and my additions didn’t most likely help):
dtc -I dts -O dtb -o qemu.dtb qemu.dts
Booting the Device
That should be the hard part done. Since we have edited the devicetree and the modifications need to be present already in the U-Boot, QEMU can’t use the on-the-fly generated devicetree. Instead, we need to pass the self-compiled devicetree with the dtb option. The whole runqemu command looks like this:
Note that you need to source the Yocto build environment to have access to runqemu command. Also, remember to set up the swtpm TPM as instructed in the Yocto Emulation texts before booting up the system. You can use the same boot script that was used in the QEMU emulation texts.
Now, when the QEMU device boots, U-Boot will perform the measurements, store them into TPM PCRs, and the kernel is aware of this fabled measurement log. To read the event log in the Linux-land, you want to make sure that the securityfs is mounted. If not, you can mount it manually with:
mount -t securityfs securityfs /sys/kernel/security
If you face issues, make sure CONFIG_SECURITYFS is present in the kernel configuration. Once that is done, you should be able to read the event log with the following command:
This outputs the event log and the contents of the PCRs. You can also use tpm2_pcrread command to directly read the current values in the PCR registers. If you turn off the emulator and re-launch it, the hashes should stay the same. And if you make a small change to for example the U-Boot bootargs variable and boot the device, register 1 should have a different value.
The Limitations
Then, the bad news. Rebooting does not quite work as expected. If you reboot the device (as opposed to shutting QEMU down and re-starting it), the PCR values output by tpm2_pcrread change on subsequent boots even though they should always be the same. The binary_bios_measurements on the other hand stays the same after reboot even if the bootargs changes, indicating that it doesn’t get properly updated either.
From what I’ve understood, this happens because PCRs are supposed to be volatile, but the emulated TPM doesn’t really “reset” the “volatile” memory during reboot because the emulator doesn’t get powered off. With the actual hardware Raspberry Pi 4 TPM module this isn’t an issue, and tpm2_pcrread results are consistent between reboots and binary_bios_measurements gets updated on every boot as expected. It took me almost 6 months of banging my head on this virtual wall to figure out that this was most likely an emulation issue. Oh well.
Closing Words
Now we have (mostly) enabled measured boot to our example machine. Magnificient! There isn’t any attestation, though, so the measurement isn’t all that useful yet. The measurements could also be extended to the Linux side with IMA. These things will be addressed in future editions of Yocto hardening, so stay tuned!
Have you ever wondered how USB devices are made? I sure have. It’s interesting how you can plug in devices using the same type of connector, and the devices work on (almost) any machine and you can get wildly different functionality from them. There are USB sound cards, network adapters, mass memory storages, oscilloscopes, table fans… The list goes on. The only limit is your imagination and five volts.
However, creating such a device seems like a big undertaking. There’s the device firmware that needs to be written, and the host side driver for the device, and the USB protocol itself is notoriously difficult to understand. However, with a good USB stack, code examples and some luck the task becomes a lot more manageable. In this blog post, I’m going to port a simple example from the TinyUSB stack to the STM32F446RE Nucleo board. I assume you have at least some basic understanding of USB and that you have completed at least the blinky project on some Nucleo board.
Mandatory Overview of USB Stuff
The first thing to always learn is the basics of the theory. However, if you’ve already tried understanding the USB protocol, you may already know that it’s not as trivial as “plug-n-play” under the hood. The spec is long, confusing and scary. I’m not going to say I understand it, and I barely even understand what’s coming up in the next chapters. But configuring these things is more or less required for getting the firmware code working, so it’s good to have some understanding of the fundamentals.
USB Host & USB Device
This is a fairly straightforward chapter, but written just to make sure that I’m correctly understood in the later chapters: USB devices connect to a USB host. In a typical scenario, the USB host is a computer, and a USB device is for example a keyboard. There may be USB hubs in between the two to increase the amount of ports in the USB host. The are also USB composite devices, which combine for example a mouse and a keyboard into a single device. Finally, there’s also a USB root hub, which is a hub in the USB host that the other devices connect to.
USB Speeds
Different versions of USB specification have defined different maximum transfer speeds for the USB protocol. As one can guess, newer protocol version = faster speed. Interestingly enough, the naming also gets increasingly confusing over time.
Low Speed (USB 1.0/1.1) [1996]
Data Transfer Rate: 1.5 Mbps
Full Speed (USB 1.0/1.1) [1996]
Data Transfer Rate: 12 Mbps
High Speed (USB 2.0) [2000]
Data Transfer Rate: 480 Mbps
SuperSpeed (USB 3.0 Gen 1) [2008]
Data Transfer Rate: 5 Gbps
SuperSpeed+ (USB 3.1 Gen 2) [2013]
Data Transfer Rate: 10 Gbps
SuperSpeed+ (USB 3.2 Gen 2×2) [2017]
Data Transfer Rate: 20 Gbps
USB4 (USB4 Gen 3×2) [2019]
Data Transfer Rate: 40 Gbps
USB4 (USB4 Gen 4) [2022]
Data Transfer Rate: 80 Gbps
The speeds listed here are the maximums for each version.
Descriptors
So far so good. The descriptors are where things start to become more confusing. This chapter won’t explain all the descriptors, because there are too many of them. However, when we are writing and porting the code we need to write some structs defining the USB descriptors of the device, so it’s good to have a basic understanding of what they are.
The USB device uses descriptors in hierarchical layers to describe itself to the USB host. The topmost descriptor is the device descriptor, which contains for example vendor ID, product ID, and supported USB version. There’s one device descriptor for the device. The device descriptor also contains the number of configuration descriptors. Configuration descriptors contain for example the power requirements and the amount of interfaces the configuration contains. The driver can select the device configuration from multiple different configurations.
The interfaces are described using, you guessed it, interface descriptors. Each configuration descriptor contains one or more of these. Interface descriptor contains for example class code, protocol code, and the amount of endpoints. Finally, endpoints are defined using endpoint descriptors. Endpoint descriptor defines for example max packet size, polling interval, transfer type and data direction of the endpoint.
The simplest type of device can have one of each of the four basic descriptors. A complex device with different configuration profiles and multiple interfaces may have a lot more. And, to make matters more confusing, there are also extra descriptors. For example, there may be class code-specific descriptors (like in our example there will be), and a string descriptor that contains strings, like for example the human-readable device name.
Creating the Device
Now that was boring, wasn’t it? It’s time to do something interesting. As one can guess from the fairly complex protocol, we’re going to need a microcontroller. I have a STM32F446RE Nucleo board lying around in my drawer, so I’m using that for this project. As far as I know, most of the Nucleo boards should work for this project, as long as they have USB OTG. As a USB stack, I chose TinyUSB which is easy enough to use and integrate. Also, I made an example repository of this project that you can use to follow along if you want.
About TinyUSB
TinyUSB is a cross-platform USB stack, suitable both for USB devices and USB hosts. It supports power management, multiple device classes, and is thread- and memory-safe. Especially the latter two are big promises. ST also provides their USB stack for their devices. However, I usually prefer to use solutions that are not vendor-specific. For example, if we would like to change the hardware from STM32F4 to Rasperry Pi Pico, it’d be a lot easier with TinyUSB. Granted, it may not necessarily be perfectly optimized for all of the devices, but having portable code and transferrable knowledge is always good.
Configuring Project and STM32 Nucleo Board
First, we’re going to integrate TinyUSB and configure the Nucleo board in the STM32CubeIDE. We are going to follow the instructions from this GitHub comment. Big thanks to the person who made it, this step would have been a nightmare otherwise.
I’m using STM32CubeIDE version 1.15.1, so the TinyUSB integration steps below apply to that version of the IDE. I’ve also tried this on version 1.9.0 and TinyUSB seems to work with that version as well, but some labels and menus may have different texts, so keep that in mind if you’re using some other version of the IDE.
The first thing to do is to create a new STM32CubeIDE project and set the target board. In my case, it’s the F446RE. The rest of the defaults (C project, STMCube target, etc.) should be fine.
The next step is adding the TinyUSB stack. This consists of adding headers and sources. First, clone the TinyUSB repository to some location where it doesn’t get added to the build sources automatically. I created Libs folder at the root of the project and cloned the repository there. After that is done, add the src and hw include folders to the project and src as the source folder by right-clicking the project in the project explorer and setting them in the project properties.
Then, we can configure the chip. Open the chip configuration ioc-file, and from the menu open Connectivity->USB_OTG_FS to set up the full-speed USB port. There may be USB_OTG_HS option as well, but the high-speed USB requires an external PHY (unless you have F7 board). OTG_HS can be configured as full speed, but let’s just stick to OTG_FS. As a side note, I find the name “full speed” ironic considering that the “maximum full speed” is less than 3% of the “maximum high speed”.
I digress. Once you’ve selected USB_OTG_FS, set the “Mode” to “Device Only”. In the Configuration window below the Mode window, under NVIC settings, enable “USB On The Go FS global interrupt”. Finally, double-check that the ST USB middleware is not enabled. Scroll down the menu, select “Middleware”, and make sure that USB_DEVICE and USB_HOST related middleware is set to “Disabled”.
USB configuration is now done, but you may still need to open the Clock Configuration tab to resolve clock issues. Just open the tab, click “Resolve Clock Issues”, and hope for the best.
Generating the code after integrating TinyUSB has one irritating side effect: it opens main.c of all the TinyUSB examples, resulting in quite a few new tabs being opened in the IDE. I’m not sure how to fix this. I can just say that this happens.
Wiring
Wiring is simple. It consists just of connecting the relevant Nucleo headers to a USB connector with jumper wires. If you don’t happen to have a spare USB connector, you can salvage one from a USB cable.
To power the board you can either use the power from the USB host coming through the USB connector, or you can plug in a cable to the Nucleo’s USB port. For development and debugging purposes, I’d recommend using Nucleo’s USB port and leaving out the power wire because Nucleo port is used for programming the device. However, the schematic below shows how to power the board using the USB connector because it’s a bit more complicated.
Notice that if you’re using the Nucleo’s USB port to power the board, the U5V rail needs to be active, and if want to power the board with your custom USB connector, the E5V rail should be active. Active rail is controlled with the jumper visualized with a blue wire in the schematic.
If you’re facing issues with the USB enumeration, for example if Windows complains that the device could not be recognized, try swapping D+ and D-. The usual mistake is to get those the wrong way around, and then wonder for too long what could be the issue. To me, it feels like these are always printed incorrectly on the silkscreen, but I’m not sure how many times I can still use that excuse.
Code
To summarize, programming the firmware consists of the following tasks:
Writing the TinyUSB configuration header
Writing the USB descriptors
Replacing the ST USB interrupt with the TinyUSB USB interrupt
Adding TinyUSB setup and device task functions
Programming the functionality of the USB device
It doesn’t make sense for me to go through these steps line-by-line, so you can check out each point from the example GitHub repository. However, I’ll go through each step on a higher, more hand-wavy level. Most of these steps rely heavily on copy-pasting the relevant code from a TinyUSB example. In this project, we are using the CDC dual ports example.
The CDC Dual Ports example demonstrates a CDC class USB device that creates two serial ports. Users can then write into either one of these two. One of the serial ports will output the written characters in lowercase, and the other port will output the same characters in uppercase.
Device class is a standardized definition that categorizes devices based on their functionality. CDC stands for “Communications Device Class”. While we’re not creating a device providing typical CDC functionality (e.g. network card, modem, fax), we can use the CDC class to easily create a serial port because that’s what devices in that class typically use for communication.
Let’s now start going through the steps. Note that the headings are links to the relevant commits.
The heading is quite descriptive of what happens in this step. We need to configure the TinyUSB with the chip we’re using, the root hub we intend to use, the mode of the root hub (host or device), the maximum supported speed, etc. In our F446RE board, the full-speed USB OTG is the root hub number 0.
To write the configuration, we can pretty much copy the configuration header tusb_config.h from the example, add the fields from the GitHub answer linked earlier, and replace the root hub number, USB speed and chip with the values applicable to our project. You can diff the configuration in the TinyUSB example and my example to see what exactly was changed.
Time for the infamous USB descriptors. Actually, this is a lot simpler than I made you believe earlier. We can simply copy the usb_descriptors.c from the example folder to our project source folder. Of course, if you were writing a USB device from scratch this step would involve more work to get the device to appear correctly to the host. I still recommend checking out the commit and trying to understand what each of the structs does and contains, as they should make (some) sense after reading about the USB descriptors.
This is an easy one. Open the file containing the generated FS USB interrupt, add a call to the TinyUSB interrupt handler, and return early to avoid calling the ST USB interrupt—literally two lines (and one include).
Before the main code enters the main loop, add tud_init call, and in the main loop call tud_task. tud stands for “TinyUSB Device” (or so I assume). Some examples have functions with tuh prefix, and these are host-related functions, so I’m guessing that is the meaning of the last letter. There is also a generic tusb_init for initializing both device and host. Discussion about the differences between the two can be found here, but to summarize tud_init is a more flexible and newer way of doing the initialization.
Note that TinyUSB and examples have an initialization function called board_setup. We are not going to use that, because the initialization code generated by CubeIDE handles the board setup for us.
The actual functionality should be the hardest part. Or at least it would be if we were making an actual device from scratch. Since we’re using a ready-made example, we can just copy the functionality we desire from the example to our project.
The functionality we want to copy over from the example contains one task that is to be run in the main loop, and a few callbacks. Quite simple, especially since TinyUSB abstracts a lot of the hardware stuff away. All we have to do is read and write the serial devices in a fairly typical fashion, nothing too USB-specific is required at this stage anymore.
Of course, this step varies wildly depending on what you’re trying to achieve. But, in our humble example project the commit enabling the functionality is quite small and easy to understand.
Testing the Device
After doing the hard work of copying the code and flashing the board, you can plug your USB connector into a computer (don’t do it on your most expensive gaming rig though, better be cautious). At least on Windows, the device should get recognized, and two new serial ports should be added to the system. If you open the serial ports (baud rate 9600), and write to one of them, you should see the input text magically appear in the other one as well. And it’s all upper- or lower-cased!
But what about the driver? Why does the device work without a driver? Well, since we are creating a CDC class device, we don’t need a special driver for it. The generic CDC driver from the operating system is used for driving the device. With more specialized functionality where we couldn’t use (or wouldn’t want to use) a device class for defining the device a custom driver would of course be required. Maybe writing a driver like that is worth a text of its own.
But for now, you should have your first USB device up and running. Not one of the easiest projects, but considering the complexity of the protocol it was in the end quite simple. Big thanks for this go to the TinyUSB project. Also, thanks to the GitHub answer I linked above as it was a massive help with getting familiar with the TinyUSB and STM32. I’m not sure if this text would have even happened without it. That’s all for now, thanks for reading.
It’s been almost ten years since I wrote my thesis. It was about guided fuzz testing, and as usual, I have done zero days of actual work related to the topic of my thesis. However, I was feeling nostalgic one day and thought that I’d fire up a good ol’ fuzzer and see what I could do with it. In the end, not much. But it was fun to try to break something and relive the golden days of my youth.
To shake things up a bit, this time I tried fuzzing a Linux kernel module in a Yocto image, because it seems that I just can’t help but cram Yocto into every blog post I write. But let’s start from the beginning.
What Is Fuzzing?
Fuzzing is a type of testing where more or less broken input is used to check how a program behaves in unexpected situations. Usually, the process consists of collecting input samples, good or bad, running them through a fuzzer that does “something” to the sample, and then feeding this mystery sample to the program being tested. Well-behaving programs handle the erroneus input gracefully, but the badly behaving programs may hang, crash, or even worse, use the bad input like nothing is wrong.
Fuzz testing can be subcategorized into a few different groups: black-box, grey-box and white-box fuzzing. In black-box fuzzing there is no knowledge of the internals of the program, and no test feedback is used to guide the fuzzer. On the other hand, when using the white-box fuzzing the full knowledge of the program flow and protocols is available. In grey-box, there is no “deep” knowledge of the program, but for example code coverage may be used to guide the fuzzer.
As one can guess, a black-box fuzzer is the simplest to set up, but generally it is inefficient. White-box fuzzing is the opposite, where the initial effort may not even be worth it in the end. Grey-box, once again, lands somewhere in the middle. The instrumentation and feedback may require some effort, but it is (usually) worth it in the form of improved results.
Fuzzing on Embedded Target
Even though fuzzing can reveal some fascinating bugs, it’s worth noting that performing fuzzing on an embedded device may not always be a good idea. Usually, the efficiency of the fuzzing is directly proportional to the amount of tests being run per second. “Real” computers tend to be more powerful, resulting in more tests getting churned out compared to the embedded systems. The requirement for speed is especially true for black-box fuzzing which is basically brute forcing bugs out of the system. Therefore, you may want to consider fuzzing high-level application code on a more powerful computer, or in a virtualized environment to reveal more complex issues.
Fuzzing on the actual hardware makes the most sense in the following scenarios:
The code you’re testing relies on some architecture-specific functionality
The code relies on some hardware functionality that cannot be easily simulated
The hardware can generate samples and run target programs with “tolerable” efficiency
You want to do a quick smoke test type of fuzzing run
However, despite trying to talk you out of fuzzing on the target HW, I personally think it’s a good idea to give a quick black-box fuzzing session at least a try. It can reveal some low-hanging bugs, and setting up a black-box fuzzer takes little to no effort. Just be aware of the limitations, and the fact that it’s not going to be as efficient as it could.
Finally, it’s worth knowing that things can go really wrong with fuzzing, so consider the potential risks, and if there’s a possibility of some hardware breaking. It’s usually unlikely, but aggressively fuzzing for example a poorly written device driver can result in bricking.
Radamsa
There are plenty of black-box fuzzers available for various purposes. Protocol fuzzers, web-app fuzzers, cloud fuzzers, etc. In this example, I’m using Radamsa. It’s a generic command line fuzzer that is simple to use yet it is fairly powerful. Not coincidentally, I also used it 10 years ago when writing my thesis.
Radamsa takes input either from stdin or from a file, and outputs fuzz either to stdout or to a file. This can then either be piped to the tested program, or the tested program can be instructed to open the file. Radamsa can also act as a TCP client or server, but I haven’t tried either of those so I can’t comment much on that. You can read more about Radamsa from it’s git repo.
The program is written in Owl Lisp, which gets translated into C, so the cross-compilation is quite straightforward once the Owl Lisp is set up. Because we don’t have to do any compilation time instrumentation for grey-box fuzzing guidance, the steps to build the fuzzer and the testable software are quite simple. The testable software in our case is going to be a kernel module. We still want to do some error instrumentation that will be covered in the next chapter, but since we’re fuzzing in kernel, it’s easier than one would guess (for once).
The Yocto recipe for building Radamsa can be found from meta-fuzzing repo I made to accompany this blog text.
Instrumentation
Breaking stuff with no consideration is rude. Breaking stuff and analyzing the results can be considered science. Therefore, to get something useful out of the fuzzing efforts we should figure out how to get as much information as possible from the system when it’s being bombarded. While black-box fuzzing doesn’t really need instrumentation, it makes fuzzing a lot more useful when we can detect more errors.
So, usually with all types of fuzzing some amount of compile-time instrumentation is used. This allows injecting extra code into the compiled binaries that may prove useful information when things start going wrong. A commonly used tool for this is AddressSanitizer (ASAN) and its fellow sanitizers. AddressSanitizer is a memory error detector that can detect things like use-after-frees, buffer overflows, and double-frees. As the nature of these bugs implies, it’s meant for C and C++ programs.
Of course, this comes with a price. On average, AddressSanitizer tends to slow down the programs 2x. Who would have guessed that injecting code into binaries has some side effects? For debugging purposes, this is still usually acceptable.
The best part of the AddressSanitizer is that it’s readily available in the Linux kernel! To enable KernelAddressSanitizer KASAN, all that needs to be done is to set two configuration flags:
CONFIG_KASAN=y
CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC=y
You can read more about the different KASAN modes from the KASAN documentation, but in summary, generic is the heaviest, but also the most compatible mode. There are faster modes, but they may be architecture and compiler specific. After enabling these flags, we can detect memory errors not only in the kernel but also in the modules we are building for that kernel.
Linux also has undefined behaviour sanitizer (UBSAN), Kernel concurrency sanitizer (KCSAN), and Kernel memory leak detector (no fun acronym), but let’s leave them out for now. They can be enabled similarly by toggling configuration flags, so no special work is needed from the driver side.
Example Module
To have something to fuzz, I wrote a simple Linux kernel module (with help from ChatGPT). The module creates two sysfs files, one that takes input and one that gives output. Anything written to the first file can be read from the second file. This allows passing data from user space to kernel space, and is a suitable input surface for fuzzing. sysfs interface isn’t maybe the most interesting one, because there is some processing that happens before the input written by user ends up in the kernel module, but it’s a simple test for verifying that the set-up works.
Rest of the stuff is quite simple. If you’re using Yocto, add the meta-fuzzing layer to your Yocto build, add the kernel configuration into your kernel config, and install Radamsa (and the test module) to the image. If you’re using something else, then you do the same things but with a different system. Then, run the image, log into it, and run the following:
echo test | radamsa
Most likely something other than test gets printed. If not, give it a few more tries. If the output doesn’t look like t ejSt after a few tries something may be wrong.
To fuzz the actual test kernel module, you can run the following:
modprobe sysfs_attribute_echo
while true
do cat /sys/kernel/sysfs_attribute_echo/output | radamsa > /sys/kernel/sysfs_attribute_echo/input
done
This probes the module, and then in a neverending loop reads the output from the kernel module, fuzzes it and passes it back to the input file. As an example of the sample file-based fuzzing, check this out:
We create three sample files, and fuzz randomly one of them. Radamsa can output the fuzzed data into a file, but we still use stdout to send it to the kernel module. The samples in this case are quite trivial, but with more interesting sample files it would be possible to generate quite exotic fuzzed data.
Does this find bugs from our module or kernel? No. Or at least it is highly unlikely. The kernel module itself is simple, and shouldn’t contain bugs (famous last words). Or, if there’s a bug, it’s either in the Linux kernel sysfs or kstrdup functions and those are already quite extensively tested (more famous last words). Unless there’s a regression of course.
However, this script demonstrates one admittedly simple approach of passing fuzzed data into the kernel space. The parsing of the data could be more exciting in a more complex module, which could in turn lead to actual bugs.
Closing Words
That’s all for this time. As shown here, the whole black-box fuzzing of the kernel can be straightforward. As mentioned about a dozen times in this text, the example was quite simple but demonstrates the point. The same ideas apply to more complex setups as well. The advantage of the black-box fuzzing is that it is easy to set up, so I recommend giving it a go and seeing what happens. Hopefully something exciting!
Why is this virtualized TPM worth the effort? Well, if you have ever been in a painful situation where you’re working with TPMs and you’re writing some scripts or programs using them, you know that the development is not as straightforward as one would hope. The flows tend to be confusing, frustrating, and difficult. Using a virtual environment that’s easy to reset and that’s quite close to the actual hardware is a nice aid for developing and testing these types of applications.
In a nutshell, the idea is to run swtpm TPM emulator on the host machine, and then launch QEMU Arm device emulator that talks with the swtpm process. QEMU has an option for a TPM device that can be passed through to the guest device, so the process is fairly easy. With these systems in place, we can have a virtual TPM chip inside the virtual machine. *insert yo dawg meme here*
TPM Emulation With swtpm
Because I’m terrible at explaining things understandably, I’m going to ask my co-author ChatGPT to summarise in one paragraph what a TPM is:
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a hardware-based security feature integrated into computer systems to provide a secure foundation for various cryptographic functions and protect sensitive data. TPM securely stores cryptographic keys, certificates, and passwords, ensuring they remain inaccessible to unauthorized entities. It enables secure boot processes, integrity measurement, and secure storage of credentials, enhancing the overall security of computing devices by thwarting attacks such as tampering, unauthorized access, and data breaches.
I’m not sure if this is easier to understand than my ramblings, but I guess it makes the point clear. It’s a hardware chip that can be used to store and generate secrets. One extra thing worth knowing is that there are two notable versions of the TPM specification: 1.2 and 2.0. When I’m talking about TPM in this blog text, I mean TPM 2.0.
Since we’re using emulated hardware, we don’t have the “hardware” part in the system. Well, QEMU has a passthrough option for hardware TPMs, but for development purposes it’s easier to have an emulated TPM, something that swtpm can be used for. Installing swtpm is straightforward, as it can be found in most of the package repositories. For example, on Ubuntu, you can just run:
sudo apt install swtpm
Building swtpm is also an option. It has quite a few dependencies though, so you may want to consider just fetching the packages. Sometimes taking the easy route is allowed.
Whichever option you choose, once you’re ready you can run the following commands to set up the swtpm and launch the swtpm process:
Once the process launches, it opens a Unix domain socket that listens to the incoming connections. It’s worth knowing that the process gets launched as a foreground job, and once a connected process exits swtpm exits as well. Next, we’re going to make QEMU talk with the swtpm daemon.
QEMU TPM
Fortunately, making QEMU communicate with TPM isn’t anything groundbreaking. There’s a whole page of documentation dedicated to this topic, so we’re just going to follow it. For Arm devices, we want to pass the following additional parameters to QEMU:
These parameters should result in the QEMU connecting to the swtpm, and using the emulated software TPM as a TPM in the emulated machine. Simple as.
One thing worth noting though. Since we’re adding a new device to the virtual machine, the device tree changes as well. Therefore, we need to dump the device tree again. This was discussed more in-depth in the first part of this emulation exercise, so I recommend reading that. In summary, you can dump the device tree with the following runqemu command:
Then, you need to move the dumped binary to a location where it can get installed to the boot partition as a part of the Yocto build. This was also discussed in the first blog text.
TPM2.0 Software Stack
Configuring Yocto
Now that we have the virtualized hardware in order, it’s time to get the software part sorted out. Yocto has a meta-layer that contains security features and programs. That layer is aptly named meta-security. To add the TPM-related stuff into the firmware image, add sub-layer meta-tpm to bblayers.conf. meta-tpm has dependencies to meta-openembedded sub-layers meta-oe and meta-python, so add those as well.
Once the layers are added, we still need to configure the build a bit. The following should be added to your distro.conf, or if you don’t have one, local.conf should suffice:
DISTRO_FEATURES:append = " tpm"
Configuring Linux Kernel
Next, to get the TPM device working together with Linux, we need to configure the kernel. First of all, the TPM feature needs to be enabled, and then the driver for our emulated chip needs to be added. If you were curious enough to decompile the QEMU device tree binary, you maybe noticed that the emulated TPM device is compatible with tcg,tpm-tis-mmio. Therefore, we don’t need a specific driver, the generic tpm-tis driver should do. The following two config lines both enable TPM and add the driver:
CONFIG_TCG_TPM=y CONFIG_TCG_TIS=y
If you’re wondering what TCG means, it stands for Trusted Computing Group, the organization that has developed the TPM standard. TIS on the other hand stands for TPM Interface Specification. There are a lot of TLAs here that begin with the letter T, and we haven’t even seen all of them yet.
Configuring U-Boot
Configuring TPM support for U-Boot is quite simple. Actually, the U-Boot I built worked straight away with the defconfig. However, if you have issues with TPM in U-Boot, you should ensure that you have the following configuration items enabled:
# Enable TPM 2.0
CONFIG_TPM=y
CONFIG_TPM_V2=y
# Add MMIO interface for device
CONFIG_TPM2_MMIO=y
# Add TPM command
CONFIG_CMD_TPM=y
# This should be enabled automatically if
# CMD_TPM and TPM_V2 are enabled
CONFIG_CMD_TPM_V2=y
Installing tpm2-tools
In theory, we now should have completed the original goal of booting a Yocto image on an emulator that has a virtual TPM. However, there’s still nothing that uses the TPM. To add plenty of packages, tpm2-tools among them, we can add the following to the image configuration:
For our testing purposes, we are mostly interested in tpm2-tools and tpm2-tss, and libtss2 that tpm2-tools requires. TSS here stands for TPM2 Software Stack. trousers is an older implementation of the stack, tpm2-abrmd (=access broker & resource manager daemon) didn’t work for me (and AFAIK using a kernel-managed device is preferred anyway), and PKCS#11 isn’t required for our simple example. libtss2-tcti-device is required to enable a TCTI (TPM Command Transmission Interface) for communication with Linux kernel TPM device files. These are the last acronyms, so now you can let out a sigh of relief.
Running QEMU
Now you can rebuild the image to compile a suitable kernel and user-space tools. Once the build finishes, you can use the following command to launch QEMU (ensure that swtpm is running):
Then, stop the booting process to drop into the U-Boot terminal. We wrote the boot script in the previous blog, but now we can add tpm2 commands to initialize and self-test the TPM. The first three commands of this complete boot script set-up and self-test the TPM:
# Initalize TPM
tpm2 init
tpm2 startup TPM2_SU_CLEAR
tpm2 self_test full
# Set boot arguments for the kernel
setenv bootargs root=/dev/vda2 console=ttyAMA0
# Load kernel image
setenv loadaddr 0x40200000
fatload virtio 0:1 ${loadaddr} zImage
# Load device tree binary
setenv loadaddr_dtb 0x49000000
fatload virtio 0:1 ${loadaddr_dtb} qemu.dtb
# Boot the kernel
bootz ${loadaddr} - ${loadaddr_dtb}
Now, once the machine boots up, you should see /dev/tpm0 and /dev/tpmrm0 devices present in the system. tpm0 is a direct access device, and tpmrm0 is a device using the kernel’s resource manager. The latter of these is the alternative to tpm2-abrmd, and we’re going to be using it for a demo.
TPM Demo
Before we proceed, I warn you that my knowledge of actual TPM usage is a bit shallow. So, the example presented here may not necessarily follow the best practices, but it should perform a simple task that should prove that the QEMU TPM works. We are going to create a key, store it in the TPM, sign a file and verify the signature. When you’ve got the device booted with the swtpm running in the background, you can start trying out these commands:
# Set environment variable for selecting TPM device
# instead of the abrmd.
export TPM2TOOLS_TCTI="device:/dev/tpmrm0"
# Create contexts
tpm2_createprimary -C e -c primary.ctx
tpm2_create -G rsa -u rsa.pub -r rsa.priv -C primary.ctx
# Load and store contexts
tpm2_load -C primary.ctx -u rsa.pub -r rsa.priv -c rsa.ctx
tpm2_evictcontrol -C o -c primary.ctx 0x81010002
tpm2_evictcontrol -C o -c rsa.ctx 0x81010003
# Remove generated files and create message
rm rsa.pub rsa.priv rsa.ctx primary.ctx
echo "my message" > message.dat
# Sign and verify signature with TPM handles
tpm2_sign -c 0x81010003 -g sha256 -o sig.rssa message.dat
tpm2_verifysignature -c 0x81010003 -g sha256 -s sig.rssa -m message.dat
If life goes your way, all the commands should succeed without issues and you can create and verify the signature using the handles in the TPM. Usually, things aren’t that simple. If you see errors related to abrmd, you may need to define the TCTI as the tpmrm0 device. The TPM2TOOLS_TCTI environment variable should do that. However, if that doesn’t work you can try adding -T "device:/dev/tpmrm0" to the tpm2_* commands, so for example the first command looks like this:
tpm2_createprimary -C e -c primary.ctx -T "device:/dev/tpmrm0"
When running the tpm2_* commands, you should see swtpm printing out plenty of information. This information includes requests and responses received and sent by the daemon. To make some sense of these hexadecimal dumps, you can use tpmstream tool.
That should wrap up my texts about QEMU, Yocto and TPM. Hopefully, these will help you set up a QEMU device that has a TPM in it. I also hope that in the long run this setup helps you to develop and debug secure Linux systems that utilize TPM properly. Perhaps I’ll write more about TPMs in the future, it was quite difficult to find understandable sources and examples utilizing its features. But maybe first I’d need to understand the TPMs a bit better myself.
So, I started to look into things like encryption and secure boot, but turns out they are quite complicated topics. Also, they more or less require a TPM (Trusted Platform Module), and I don’t have a board with such a chip. And even if I did, it’d be more useful to have flexible hardware for future experiments. And for writing blog texts that can be easily followed along it’d be beneficial if that hardware would be easily available for everyone.
Hardware emulation sounds like a solution to all of these problems. Yocto provides a script for using QEMU (Quick EMUlator) in the form of runqemu wrapper. However, by default that script seems to just boot up the kernel and root file system using whatever method QEMU considers the best (depending on the architecture). Also, runqemu passes just the root file system partition as a single drive to the emulator. Emulating a device with a bootloader and a partitioned disk image is a bit tricky thing to do, but that’s exactly what we’re going to do in this text. In the next part we’re going to throw a TPM into the mix, but for now, let’s focus on the basics.
Configuring the Yocto Build
Before we start, I’ll say that you can find a meta-layer containing the code presented here from GitHub. So if you don’t want to copy-paste everything, you can clone the repo. It’ll contain some more features in the future but the basic functionality created in this blog text should be present in the commit cf4372a.
Machine Configuration
To start, we’re going to define some variables related to the image being built. To do that, we will define our machine configuration that is an extension of a qemuarm configuration:
require conf/machine/qemuarm.conf
# Use the same overrides as qemuarm machine
MACHINEOVERRIDES:append = ":qemuarm"
# Set the required entrypoint and loadaddress
# These are usually 00008000 for Arm machines
UBOOT_ENTRYPOINT = "0x00008000"
UBOOT_LOADADDRESS = "0x00008000"
# Set the imagetype
KERNEL_IMAGETYPE = "zImage"
# Set kernel loaddaddr, should match the one u-boot uses
KERNEL_EXTRA_ARGS += "LOADADDR=${UBOOT_ENTRYPOINT}"
# Add wic.qcow2 image that can be used by QEMU for drive image
IMAGE_FSTYPES:append = " wic.qcow2"
# Add wks file for image partition definition
WKS_FILE = "qemu-test.wks"
# List artifacts in deploy dir that we want to be in boot partition
IMAGE_BOOT_FILES = "zImage qemu.dtb"
# Ensure things get deployed before wic builder tries to access them
do_image_wic[depends] += " \
u-boot:do_deploy \
qemu-devicetree:do_deploy \
"
# Configure the rootfs drive options. Biggest difference to original is
# format=qcow2, in original the default format is raw
QB_ROOTFS_OPT = "-drive id=disk0,file=@ROOTFS@,if=none,format=qcow2 -device virtio-blk-device,drive=disk0"
Drive Image Configuration with WIC
Once that is done, we can write the wks file that’ll guide the process that creates the wic image. wic image can be considered as a drive image with partitions and such. Writing wks files is worth a blog text of its own, but here’s the wks file I’ve been using that creates a drive containing two partitions:
The first partition is a FAT boot partition where we will store the kernel and device tree so that the bootloader can load them. Second is the ext4 root file system, containing all the lovely binaries Yocto spends a long time building.
Device Tree
We have defined the machine and the image. The only thing that is still missing is the device tree. The device tree defines the hardware of the machine in a tree-like format and should be passed to the kernel by the bootloader. QEMU generates a device tree on-the-fly, based on the parameters passed to it. The generated device tree binary can be dumped by adding -machine dumpdtb=qemu.dtb to the QEMU command. With runqemu, you can use the following command to pass the parameter:
However, here we have a circular dependency. The image depends on the qemu-devicetree recipe to deploy the qemu.dtb, but runqemu cannot be run without an image, so the image needs to built to dump the device tree. To sort this out, remove the qemu-devicetree dependency from the machine configuration, build once, and dump the device tree. Then re-enable the dependency.
After this, you can give the device tree binary to a recipe and deploy it from there. Or you could maybe decompile it to a source file, and then re-compile the source as a part of kernel build to do things “correctly”. I was lazy and just wrote a recipe that deploys the binary:
SUMMARY = "QEMU device tree binary"
DESCRIPTION = "Recipe deploying the generated QEMU device tree binary blob"
LICENSE = "MIT"
LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://${COMMON_LICENSE_DIR}/MIT;md5=0835ade698e0bcf8506ecda2f7b4f302"
SRC_URI = "file://qemu.dtb"
inherit deploy
do_deploy() {
install -d ${DEPLOYDIR}
install -m 0664 ${WORKDIR}/*.dtb ${DEPLOYDIR}
}
addtask do_deploy after do_compile before do_build
Once that is done, you should be able to build the image. I recommend checking out the meta-layer repo if you found this explanation confusing. I’m using core-image-base as the image recipe, but you should be able to use pretty much any image, assuming it doesn’t overwrite variables in machine configuration.
Setting up QEMU
Running runqemu
We should now have an image that contains everything needed to emulate a boot process: it has a bootloader, a kernel and a file system. We just need to get the runqemu to play along nicely. To start booting from the bootloader, we want to pass the bootloader as a BIOS for QEMU. Also, we need to load the wic.qcow2 file instead of the rootfs.ext4 as the drive source so that we have the boot partition present for the bootloader. All this can be achieved with the following command:
nographic isn’t mandatory if you’re running in an environment that has visual display capabilities. To this day I still don’t quite understand how the runqemu argument parsing works, even though I tried going through the script source. It simultaneously feels like it’s very picky about the order of the parameters, and that it doesn’t matter at all what you pass and at what position. But at least the command above works.
Booting the Kernel
If things go well, you should be greeted with the u-boot log. If you’re quick, spam any key to stop the boot, and if you’re not, spam Ctrl-C to stop bootloader’s desperate efforts of TFTP booting. I’m not 100% sure why the default boot script fails to load the kernel, I think the boot script doesn’t like the boot partition being a FAT partition on a virtio interface. To be honest, I would have been more surprised if the stock script would have worked out of the box. However, what works is the script below:
# Set boot arguments for the kernel
setenv bootargs root=/dev/vda2 console=ttyAMA0
# Load kernel image
setenv loadaddr 0x40200000
fatload virtio 0:1 ${loadaddr} zImage
# Load device tree binary
setenv loadaddr_dtb 0x49000000
fatload virtio 0:1 ${loadaddr_dtb} qemu.dtb
# Boot the kernel
bootz ${loadaddr} - ${loadaddr_dtb}
This script does exactly what the comments say: it loads the two artefacts from the boot partition and boots the board. We don’t have an init RAM disk, so we skip the second parameter of bootz. I also tried to create a FIT (firmware image tree) image with uImage to avoid having multiple boot files in the boot partition. Unfortunately, that didn’t quite work out. Loading the uImage got the device stuck with a nefarious "Starting kernel ..." message for some reason.
Back to the task at hand: if things went as they should have, the kernel should boot with the bootz, and eventually you should be dropped to the kernel login prompt. You can run mount command to see that the boot partition gets mounted, and cat /proc/cmdline to check that vda2 indeed was the root device that was used.
Closing Words And What’s Next
Congratulations! You got the first part of the QEMU set-up done. The second half with the TPM setup will follow soon. The example presented here could be improved in a few ways, like by adding a custom boot script for u-boot so that the user doesn’t have to input the script manually to boot the device, and by getting that darn FIT image working. But those will be classified as “future work” for now. Until next time!
It’s time to finish a project. Lately, I have been mostly interested in embedded tinkering, but I’m also fascinated by audio and DSP programming. Partially because it is an interesting field, but mostly because I make music as a hobby so it’s interesting to see how the virtual instruments and audio effects work. So, in this text I’m presenting my first full-fledged and complete VST plug-in, Pastel Distortion. In a way it’s my second plug-in, as I used to make Delayyyyyy plug-in (that’s mentioned in some older texts of this blog as well), but that project has been abandoned in a state that I can’t quite call complete. However, here’s a screenshot of something that I actually have completed:
In short, VST plug-ins are software used in music production. They create and modify the sound based on the information they’re given by the VST host, that is usually a digital audio workstation. Plug-ins are commonly chained together so that one plug-in’s output is connected to the next one’s input. This is all done real-time, while the music is playing.
There will be free downloads at the end, but first, let’s go through the history of the project, some basic theory, and a six-paragraph subchapter that I like to call “I’m not sponsored by JUCE, but I should be”.
History of the Project
About two and a half years ago I started working on a distortion VST plug-in following this tutorial. Half a year after that, I got distracted when I thought about testing the plug-in (which resulted in this blog text and my first conference talk). As a side note, it may tell something about the development process and schedule when testing is “thought about” six months after starting the project. A year after that I got a Macbook for Macing Mac builds and got distracted by the new shiny laptop. And some time after that I made some overenthusiastic plans for the plug-in that didn’t quite come to reality and then I forgot to develop the plug-in.
The timeline is almost as confusing as Marvel Multiverse and full of delays, detours and time loops. In the end, I’ve just come to a conclusion that I’ll release this Pastel Distortion as it is, and add the new cool features later on if there’s interest in the plug-in. If there’s no interest, I can start working on a new plug-in, so it’s a win-win situation. But let’s finish this first.
What Is Waveshaping Distortion?
The Physics
In the real world that surrounds us all, sound is a change of pressure in a medium. Our ears then receive these changes of pressure and turn them into some sort of electricity in the brain. In short, it’s magic, that’s the best way I can explain it. To translate this into the world of computers, a microphone receives changes of pressure in air and converts them into changes in electricity that an analogue-to-digital converter then turns into ones and zeros understood by a computer. Magic, but of a slightly different kind.
After this transformation, we can process the analogue sound in the digital domain, and then convert it back into an analogue signal and play it out from speakers. Commonly the pressure/voltage changes get mapped into numbers between some range. One common range is [-1.0, 1.0]. -1.0 and 1.0 represent the extreme pressure changes where the microphone’s diaphragm is at its limit positions (=receiving loud sound), while the value of 0 is the position where it receives no pressure (receiving= silence).
The Maths
Now we’ve established what sound is. But what is waveshaping distortion? You can think of it as a function that gets applied to the sampled values. Let’s take an example function that does not actually do any shaping, y=x:
This is quite possibly the dullest shaping function. It takes x as an input, and returns it. However, this is in theory what waveshaping does. It takes the input samples from -1.0 to 1.0, puts them into mathematical function, and uses output for new samples. Let’s take another example, y=sign(x):
This takes an input sample and outputs one of the extreme values. You can emulate this effect by turning up the gain of a microphone, shoving the mic in your mouth, and screaming as loud as possible. It’s not really a nice effect. Finally, let’s take a look at a useful function, y=sqrt(x) where x >= 0, y=-sqrt(-x) where x < 0:
Finally, we get a function that does something but isn’t too extreme. This will create a sound that’s more pronounced because the quieter samples get amplified. Or, in other words, values get mapped further away from zero. The neat part is that the waveshaper function can be pretty much anything. It can be a simple square root curve like here. It also can be a quartic equation combined with all of the trigonometric functions (assuming your processor can calculate it fast enough). Maybe it doesn’t sound good, but it’s possible.
But Why Bother?
It’s always a good idea to think why something is done. Why would I want to use my precious processor time to calculate maths when I could be playing DOOM instead? As an engineer, I’m not 100% sure, I think it has something to do with psychoacoustics which is a field of science of which I know nothing about and to be honest it sounds a bit made up. From a music producer’s point of view, I can say that distortion effects make the sound have more character, warmth, and loudness (and other vague adjectives which don’t mean anything), so it’s a good thing.
Implementing the Distortion
I have talked about JUCE earlier in this blog, but I think that’s been so long ago that it’s forgotten. So I’ll summarize it shortly again. It’s a framework for creating audio software. It handles input and output routing, VST interfacing, user interface, and all that other boring stuff so that we can focus on what we actually want to do: making the computer go bleep-bloop.
The actual method of audio signal processing may vary between different types of projects. For a VST audio effect like this, there usually is a processBlock function that receives an input buffer periodically. It is then your duty as a plug-in developer to do whatever you want with that input buffer and fill it with values that you deem correct. Doing all this in a reasonable amount of CPU time, of course.
In this Pastel Distortion plug-in, we receive an input buffer filled with values ranging from -1.0 to 1.0, and then we feed those samples to the waveshaping function and replace the buffer contents with the newly calculated values. Sounds simple, and to be honest, that’s exactly what it is because JUCE does most of the heavy work.
JUCE has a ProcessorChain template class that can be filled with various effects to process the audio. There’s a WaveShaper processor, to which you simply give the mathematical function you want it to perform, and the rest is done almost automatically! As you can guess, the plug-in uses that. In the plug-in there are also some filters, EQs, and compressors to tame the distorted signal a bit more because the distortion can start to sound really ugly really quickly. That doesn’t mean that you can’t create ugly sounds with Pastel Distortion, quite the contrary.
The life of a designer is a life of fight: fight against the ugliness
Another great feature of JUCE is that it has a graphics library built-in. It’s especially good in a sense that an embedded developer like me can create a somewhat professional-looking user interface, even though I usually program small devices where the only human-computer interaction methods are a power switch and a two-colour LED. Although I have to admit, most of the development time went into making the user interface. You wouldn’t believe the amount of hours that went into drawing these little swirls next to the knobs.
All in all, Pastel Distortion is a completed plug-in that I think is quite polished (at least considering the usual standards for my projects). There’s the distortion effect of course, but in addition to that there’s tone control to shape the distortion and output signal, a dry-wet mixer for blending the distorted and clean signal, and multiple waveshape functions to choose from. Besides GUI, I also spent quite a lot of time tweaking the distortion parameters, so hopefully that effort can be heard in the final product.
There’s still optimization that could be done, but the performance is in fairly good shape already. At least compared to the FL Studio stock distortion plug-in Disructor it seems to have about the same CPU usage. Disructor averages at around 8%, while Pastel Distortion averages at 9%. Considering the fact that my previous delay plug-in used about 20% I consider this a great success. This good number is most likely a result of the optimizations in JUCE and not because of my programming genius.
But enough talk, let’s get to the interesting stuff. How to try this thing out?
Getting Pastel Distortion
Obtaining Pastel Distortion plug-in is quite easy. Just click this link to go to the Gumroad page where you can get it. And if you’re quick, you can get it for free! The plug-in costs $0 until the end of February 2024. After that you can get the demo version for free to try it out, or if you ask me I can generate some sort of a discount code for it (I’d like to get feedback on the product in exchange for the discount).
If you don’t want to download Pastel Distortion but want to see it in action, check out the video below. I put all the skills I’ve learned from Windows Movie Maker and years of using Ableton into this one:
That’s all this time. I’ve already started working on the next plug-in, let’s hope that it won’t take another two and a half years. Maybe the next text will be out sooner than that when I get something else ready that’s worth writing about. I’ve been building a Raspberry Pi Pico-based gadget lately, and it got a bit out of hand, but maybe I’ll finish that soon.
The biggest fans of this blog (or just the people usually browsing between 6:00-7:00 UTC) may have noticed a frustrating issue where the site occasionally loads really slowly. Or in the worst-case scenario, refuses to load at all. Only an error page containing a message about a failing database connection gets returned.
Investigating Issue
This issue started to occur sporadically in August and became consistent in October. And I started to consider fixing it in November. This kind of relaxed response time is common for hobby projects. The first obvious step to fix the issue was to check what was going on in the server when load times got longer. Once I noticed that the site was slowing down, I checked the monitoring stats. From the graphs, I saw that both CPU usage and disk reads were spiking. CPU was peaking at 80%, and disk reads were over 100MB/s for over 15 minutes. From the 7-day monitoring graph, it could be seen that this kind of spiking was happening almost daily.
Investigating the system log and comparing it with the time stamps of the peaks revealed the following cycle:
One of the two daily apt package manager upgrade services gets started
The CPU and disk activity starts ramping up
The system starts heavy swapping and the website load times get longer
About 15-20 minutes after the apt service starts the OOM (out-of-memory) killer kicks in and stops MySQL. Few other services may time out or get killed in this phase as well.
MySQL restarts and the blog works again
I started investigating why the daily apt services seemed to constantly cause the server to run out of memory. The first of the two services downloaded the packages for upgrading, and the second one installed the downloaded upgrades. After trying out a few different things I realized that just installing or removing a package caused the server to randomly run out of memory if either of the apt services was started a few minutes earlier. It’s fun to do tests like this on a live server.
Fix Attempt 1: Installing System Upgrades
Some further investigation into the daily apt services revealed that the unattended upgrades had been failing for a long time. It seemed like the MySQL apt repository was missing keys, causing the apt update to fail. Also, it seemed like some upgrades required input from the user to configure packages. So I took a server backup and started installing the upgrades manually.
Out of 141 packages, 127 wanted an update, which is “quite many” (to put it lightly). Fortunately, I have made no promises about the availability of this site, so I could liberally reboot the server as much as I needed for the upgrades. I was hoping that installing these pending upgrades would clear some cache that would reduce the RAM usage of the apt services. And in the worst-case scenario, it wouldn’t fix the issue but I would get an up-to-date server, so upgrading seemed like a win-win.
In addition to the upgrades I also installed an improved DigitalOcean monitoring service. This actually revealed something that should have been quite obvious from the beginning. The new monitoring service monitored RAM usage (the old one did not), and I could see that the server was using 90% of the RAM when it was idle. In hindsight, checking the RAM usage and monitoring how it gets consumed should have been the very first step when investigating an OOM issue.
Needless to say, 90% RAM usage is not good. I guess this happens because I’m running this blog on a low-end instance that doesn’t have much of RAM (I actually checked the minimum requirements of the OS, and the instance barely fills even that). However, before investigating the insufficient RAM, I wanted to first see if the upgrades would fix the original OOM issue. They did not.
So, the problem started to seem like a case of insufficient RAM. To fix this kind of issue, there are usually two options: scale the server up or scale the services down. In other words, throw money at the problem, or try to optimize the server. Being a cheapskate I chose the latter option. Also, I usually work with embedded things, so “just adding more RAM” feels like cheating. Also, considering the fact that on average I have about 20 daily visitors, beefing up the server seems like the wrong direction.
Fix Attempt 2: Optimizing RAM Usage
I used top to check the biggest memory consumers, and found two RAM gluttons: MySQL and Apache. Both are required for the well-being and existence of WordPress (that is the platform of this blog), but perhaps they could be optimized. At least they used to work on the server before, so perhaps they could be configured to work once again.
In the case of MySQL, there was a single mysqld daemon that was consuming plenty of RAM. Some googling revealed that disabling performance schema could help lower memory consumption. It seems to be a feature that measures the performance of the MySQL database server. Considering the fact that I’m using WordPress and I hope to write zero direct database queries to the database, that seemed nonmandatory. Perhaps when developing new software using MySQL such stats could be useful. Disabling performance schema lowered the mysqld RAM consumption from 39% to 19%.
In the case of Apache, there were ten worker threads, each consuming about 5%-8% of RAM. If my math is correct, in the last month I had about 0.00083 concurrent visitors on average. With that in mind, ten worker threads felt a bit excessive, and I scaled their amount down. I think it could be lowered even more, but I wanted to have enough workers in case there’s a sudden influx of readers.
Conclusion
These actions took the idle RAM usage from 90% down to 60%. After this drop, I haven’t seen the OOM killer get activated in the past seven days, so I hope the issue is fixed. 60% is still a bit more than I’d like, but as long as the server stays stable and the performance doesn’t notably degrade I think that’s an acceptable percentage. Also, using the cheaper virtual machine saves me $6 a month!
The root cause for the increased RAM usage is still a bit of a mystery. I’m suspecting that installing WordPress plugins caused it because I was installing SEO plugins around the time the issue became more prevalent. If there’s one thing I’ve learnt from this, it’s that updates should be checked manually every now and then, and consumption of the system resources should be constantly monitored.
So yeah, I managed to get a commit into one of the open-source projects that I use on a daily basis: BusyBox. I guess many others use it too, either knowingly or unknowingly. BusyBox is a software suite providing plenty of Unix utilities in a minimized single executable. For example, when you’re using dmesg command you don’t necessarily know if the implementation comes from util-linux or BusyBox. But if you’re using OpenWRT, Alpine or Yocto you’re most likely using the BusyBox version.
The Problem
Because the BusyBox binary is minimized, the utilities it provides are often missing lesser-used features. As mentioned in the previous Aioli devblog, start-stop-daemon is for example missing -d/--chdir option present in the full Debian counterpart. As mentioned in that text, I wrote a patch to add that feature. What I didn’t really mention is that I submitted the patch to the BusyBox mailing list. I was hoping that it would get applied, and eventually it did!
start-stop-daemon is a program that’s commonly used in the SysVinit scripts to control the lifecycle of the system services. It doesn’t only start and stop daemons, it can also reload them, check their status and… well that’s primarily that. What --chdir option does is that it changes the working directory of the start-stop-daemon process before it launches the program it’s been assigned to start. This effectively changes the working directory of the process that will actually be started.
The Solution
The patch for this feature was quite straightforward. Mostly it consisted of adding a variable to hold the new working directory, inserting the new -d option to the opt list for the option parser, and editing the usage message. Then, if the new option flag was set, it was just a matter of calling the xchdir() in libbb (BusyBox’s library) to change the directory to the given directory (or die).
In addition to this, I looked at how the tests for BusyBox work and wrote tests for the new flag. And cleaned up the TODO. In the end, the commit delta ended up being less than 60 lines. From what I’ve understood of the commit stats, the start-stop-daemon got bloated by about 79 bytes as a result. So the next time you’re updating BusyBox and curse the fact that it doesn’t fit into your root file system that has 67 bytes of free space remaining, you know who to blame.
All in all, getting the patch merged was an interesting process. I could definitely contribute more to BusyBox if there are suitable issues. Something perhaps a bit less simple the next time. But whether there will be more commits or not, it’s wild to think that my code could be running in Linux boxes around the world. Although, I guess that would require the device vendors to update their devices to run the new (still unreleased) version of BusyBox, so I guess it’s not happening too soon.
Would you like to make your Yocto image a tiny bit harder to hack ‘n’ crack? Of course you would. This time we’re going to be doing two things to improve its security: hardening the Linux kernel, and setting the hardening flags for GCC. The motivation for these is quite obvious. Kernel is the privileged core of the system, so it better be as hardened as possible. GCC compilation flags on the other hand affect almost every C and C++ binary and library that gets compiled into the system. As you may know, over the years we’ve gotten quite a few of them, so it’s a good idea to use any help the compiler can provide with hardening them.
Kernel Configuration Hardening
Linux kernel is the heart of the operating system and environment. As one can guess, configuring the kernel incorrectly or enabling everything in the kernel “just in case” will in the best situation lead to suboptimal performance and/or size, and in the worst case, it’ll provide unnecessary attack surfaces. However, optimizing the configuration manually for size, speed, or safety is a massive undertaking. According to Linux from Scratch, there are almost 12,000 configuration switches in the kernel, so going through all of them isn’t really an option.
Fortunately, there are automatic kernel configuration checkers that can help guide the way. Alexander Popov’s Kernel Hardening Checker is one such tool, focusing on the safety of the kernel. It combines a few different security recommendations into one checker. The project’s README contains the list of recommendations it uses as the guideline for a safe configuration. The README also contains plenty of other useful information, like how to run the checker. Who would have guessed! For the sake of example, let’s go through the usage here as well.
Obtaining and Analyzing Kernel Hardening Information
The kernel-hardening-checker doesn’t actually only check the kernel configuration that defines the build time hardening, but it also checks the command line and sysctl parameters for boot-time and runtime hardening as well. Here’s how you can obtain the info for each of the checks:
Kernel configuration: in Yocto, you can usually find this from ${STAGING_KERNEL_BUILDDIR}/.config, e.g. <build>/tmp/work-shared/<machine>/kernel-build-artifacts/.config
Command line parameters: run cat /proc/cmdline on the system to print the command line parameters
Sysctl parameters: run sysctl -a on the system to print the sysctl information
Once you’ve collected all the information you want to check, you can install and run the tool in a Python virtual environment like this:
Note that you don’t have to perform all the checks if you don’t want to. The command will print out the report, most likely recommending plenty of fixes. Green text is better than red text. Note that not all of the recommendations necessarily apply to your system. However, at least disabling the unused features is usually a good idea because it reduces the attack surface and (possibly) optimizes the kernel.
To generate the config fragment that contains the recommended configuration, you can use the -g flag without the input files. As the README states, the configuration flags may have performance and/or size impacts on the kernel. This is listed as recommended reading about the performance impact.
GCC Hardening
Whether you like it or not, GCC is the default compiler in Yocto builds. Well, there exists meta-clang for building with clang, and as far as I know, the support is already in quite good shape, but that’s beside the point. Yocto has had hardening flags for GCC compilation for quite some time. To check these flags, you can run the following command:
bitbake <image-name> -e | grep ^SECURITY_CFLAGS=
How the security flags get applied to the actual build flags may vary between Yocto versions. In Kirkstone, SECURITY_CFLAGS gets added to TARGET_CC_ARCH variable, which gets set to HOST_CC_ARCH, which finally gets added to CC command. HOST_CC_ARCH gets also added to CXX and CPP commands, so SECURITY_CFLAGS apply also to C++ programs. bitbake -e is your friend when trying to figure out what gets set and where.
So, in addition to checking the SECURITY_CFLAGS, you most likely want to check the CC variable as well to see that the flags actually get added to the command that gets run:
# Note that the CC variable gets exported so grep is slightly different
bitbake <image-name> -e |grep "^export CC="
The flags are defined in security_flags.inc file in Poky (link goes to Kirkstone version of the file). It also shows how to make package-specific exceptions with pn-<package-name> override. The PIE (position-independent executables) flags are perhaps worth mentioning as they’re a bit special. The compiler is built to create position-independent executables by default (seen in GCCPIE variable), so PIE flags are empty and not part of the SECURITY_CFLAGS. Only if PIE flags are not wanted, they are explicitly disabled.
Extra Flags for GCC
Are the flags defined in security_flags.inc any good? Yes, they are, but they can also be expanded a bit. GCC will most likely get in early 2024 new -fhardened flag that sets some options not present in Yocto’s security flags:
Lines 2, 3, and 6 are not present in the Yocto flags. Those could be added using a SECURITY_CFLAGS:append in a suitable place if so desired. I had some trouble with the trivial-auto-var-init flag though, seems like it is introduced in GCC version 12.1 while Yocto Kirkstone is still using 11 series. Most of the aforementioned flags are explained quite well in this Red Hat article. Considering there’s plenty of overlap with the SECURITY_CFLAGS and -fhardened, it may be that in future versions of Poky the security flags will contain just -fhardened (assuming that the flag actually gets implemented).
All in all, assuming you have a fairly modern version of Yocto, this GCC hardening chapter consists mostly of just checking that you have the SECURITY_CFLAGS present in CC variable and adding a few flags. Note once again that using the hardening flags has its own performance hit, so if you are writing something really time- or resource-critical you need to find a suitable balance with the hardening and optimization levels.
In Closing
While this was quite a short text, and the GCC hardening chapter mostly consisted of two grep commands and silly memes, the Linux kernel hardening work is something that actually takes a long time to complete and verify. At least my simple check for core-image-minimal with systemd enabled resulted in 136 recommendation fails and 110 passes. Fixing it would most likely take quite a bit longer than writing this text. Perhaps not all of the issues need to be fixed but deciding what’s an actual issue and what isn’t takes its own time as well. So good luck with that, and until next time!
The Movember blog series continues with this text! As usual, after reading this text I ask you to do something good. Good is a bit subjective, so you most likely know what’s something good that you can do. I’m going to eat a hamburger, change ventilation filters, and donate a bit to charity.